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Organisational Learning and the Double Bind: the case of the Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust   
Tosey, P., Saunders, M.N.K., Doherty, C. and Langley, D. 
 
Introduction 
 
The question of how it is that organisations do, or do not, learn has engaged scholars 
ever since Cyert and March (1963) coined the term `organisational learning’. It also 
has considerable practical importance due to the frequency with which organisations 
are exhorted to learn from crises or scandals. Prominent recent examples in the UK 
concern crises associated with unsatisfactory patient care in the National Health 
Service (NHS).  
 
A discourse of learning surrounds such crises. For example, Robert Francis QC, who 
led two Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust inquiries, emphasises `the need to 
learn from the two inquiries in Stafford’ (foreword to Thorlby et al., 2014:4). The 
implication of such rhetoric is that learning, often formalised through some form of 
inquiry, should enable interventions to be developed and implemented that will ensure 
that such failings do not reoccur. Despite this rhetoric, experience suggests that such 
failings do reoccur regularly (Walshe and Higgins, 2002), implying that the desired 
learning is seldom realised. It seems especially puzzling that organisations appear to 
fail to learn from such crises despite exhortations to do so, and despite their own 
efforts. 
 
It scarcely seems necessary, given that the tragic consequences of such crises are 
well-documented, to emphasise the importance of improving our ability to understand 
what may be preventing such learning and, if possible to suggest remedies. The aim of 
this paper is to conceptualise these issues within the field of Organisational Learning 
(OL) in order to explore the possibility that reasons for such failure to learn are more 
complex than a lack of will, intention, or ability to implement solutions proposed by 
inquiry reports. We suggest that there is a need for new insight into barriers to OL in 
these situations, and we explore the potential for such insight to be provided by 
Bateson’s concept of the double bind (Bateson et al., 1956; Bateson, 2005). This 
concept is chosen purposely because it illuminates how attempts to achieve OL can 
fail despite people’s best efforts.  
 
We apply Bateson’s concept to the longitudinal case of one UK NHS organisation, the 
Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, which features what could be described as 
an ongoing crises concerning Staffordshire hospital in particular. Drawing on publically 
available secondary data, including inquiry reports and news items, we use Bateson’s 
concept of the double bind as an interpretive framework through which to illuminate the 
dynamics affecting OL. The proposition we explore is that the crisis at the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust can be understood as creating a double bind 
situation; and that this offers a potential explanation for the prospect that the desired 
OL will not ensue.  
  
The paper begins with a consideration of the concept of Bateson’s double bind and its 
relationship with OL. Next we provide a temporal overview of the Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust crisis, before applying the lens of the double bind. Our 
concluding discussion debates whether, and to what extent, the double bind concept 
offers useful insights into barriers to the kind of OL that is called for when such crises 
occur.  
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The concept of the double bind and organisational learning 
 
Writers have conceptualised organisational learning as a dichotomy between types or 
orders of learning (Tosey et al., 2012). Although this dichotomy has been referred to 
using a variety of labels, such as single-loop and double-loop (Argyris and Schön, 
1996); lower-level and higher-level (Fiol and Lyles, 1985); and adaptive and generative 
learning (Senge, 1990), a reasonable consensus has been established that they refer 
to comparable learning processes and outcomes (Tosey et al., 2012).  
 
In its basic form, single-loop learning is action-oriented, routine, and incremental, 
occurring within existing  frameworks, norms, policies and rules (Argyris, 1999), having 
been characterised as the response to the question, `are we doing things right?’ 
(Romme and Witteloostuijn, 1999: 452). However, where organisations are 
experiencing more profund problem situations a qualitatively distinct, secondary form 
of learning is necessary. Such double-loop learning aims to correct mismatches by 
modifying the frameworks, norms, policies and routines underlying day-to-day actions 
and routines (Cope, 2003). It therefore involves reframing problem situations and 
learning to see them in new ways, and has been characterised as the response to the 
question, `are we doing the right things?’ (Romme and Witteloostuijn, 1999:452).  
 
However, in both single and double loop learning there is an implication that learning is 
primarily conscious and planned. This suggests in turn that OL can be accomplished 
intentionally, given the requisite intelligence, skill and commitment. In our view, such a 
suggestion should be questioned. We seek to explore an alternative possibility, namely 
that conscious, planned learning is inadequate when faced with the complex problems 
represented by such crises; and furthermore, that attempts to resolve such problems 
through intentional planned learning can be counter-productive. In essence this is 
because the type of solution proposed and the nature of the problem are mismatched; 
the solution can make things worse, not better. 
 
In order to attempt this we adopt Bateson’s concept of the double bind (Bateson et al., 
1956; Bateson, 2005). Originally developed in the context of family systems, the 
double bind concept refers to a choice between complementary yet opposing or 
contradictory solutions (Lawley, 2000), referred to as a prototypical bind, compounded 
by an additional bind that not only prevents resolution of, but also prohibits escape 
from, the prototypical bind. For example, resolution of a prototypical bind expressed by 
the dilemma ‘damned if I do and damned if I don’t’, might be prevented by an additional 
bind, ‘if I reject damnation, I will suffer an even worse fate than damnation’. Hence, 
whilst a dilemma can usually be overcome by reconceptualising, within a double bind 
the dilemma is compounded by an injunction that prevents reconceptualising, and thus 
escape. In effect, Bateson’s concept implies that human communication generates an 
order of complexity that renders conscious, planned solutions ineffective. Double binds 
cannot be avoided or eliminated as actions taken from within a bind to escape it can 
simply reinforce it.  
 
Bateson argued that double binds exist as patterns of thought and belief that are 
perceived as real by participants and have real effects, providing a context for their 
behaviours (Harries-Jones, 1995). Although often thought of as rare and necessarily 
pathological, following Bateson (1973) we regard double binds as common and 
endemic in human organisations; `part of the fabric of ordinary life’ (Bateson, 2005:15).  
 
A double bind consists of five components (Bateson et al.,1956), comprising those 
involved (component one), the nature of their relationship (component two) and 
associated communication - a primary injunction (component three) and a secondary 
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injunction (component four) - which together make up the prototypical bind. This is 
compounded by communication that denies that the bind exists; the pretence of not 
being in a bind then needs to be maintained in order to avoid punishment – which 
Harries-Jones (1995) refers to as denial of the existence of a falsified context.  
 
A tertiary injunction with associated punishment that prevents escape from the 
prototypical bind provides the additional bind (component five). Bateson (Bateson et 
al., 1956; Bateson, 2005) argued that where the intensity of the significant relationship 
and the severity of punishments were high, the double bind was likely to be more 
harmful.   
 
In summary the five components, which comprise the framework that we shall apply to 
our case, are:  
 
1. Two or more persons or parties; 
2. In a significant relationship involving a repeated, recurrent experience; 
3. A primary injunction reinforced by punishment - if you do this you will be 
damned;  
4. A secondary injunction conflicting with the primary injunction also reinforced by 
punishment - if you do not do this you will be damned;   
5. A tertiary injunction with associated punishment that prevents escape from the 
bind - if you reject damnation you will suffer an even worse fate.   
 
OL literature that makes explicit use of double bind theory is limited to date. Dopson 
and Neumann (1998) refer to the double bind in their study of British middle managers’ 
reactions to change, specifically when `being forced to choose between two equally 
undesirable alternatives’ (Dopson and Neumann, 1998:S66). Doern and Visser (2013) 
apply the concept to an analysis of barriers to entrepreneurship in Russia. People in 
organisations inevitably develop ways of construing and responding to double binds. 
How they do this has implications for OL. According to Visser (2007), the nature of the 
double bind is such that it prevents double-loop learning; the behavioural conditioning 
of individuals within their organisational contexts will impact upon their ability to 
respond to the double bind and, as a consequence, the ability of the organisation to 
learn (Visser, 2007).  
 
The proposition we explore below is that the crisis at the Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust can be understood as creating a double bind situation; and that this 
offers a potential explanation for the prospect that the desired OL will not ensue.  
 
Methodology 
A double bind comprises communications taking place within a particular context, and 
can be inferred from observable behaviours and accounts. This paper relies on 
longitudinal, textual documentary secondary data (Saunders et al. 2012) from accounts 
in publically available sources in order to produce a case study of the Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust. These documents comprise principally data originally collected 
as part of the two associated inquiries and compiled subsequently within the inquiry 
reports (Francis 2010a, 2010b, 2013a, 2013b) and associated media reports.  Such 
documents provided unobtrusive access to large amounts of data, the inquiry reports 
including first hand responses from the key actors in the process; and allowed changes 
to be tracked and insights developed (Bowen, 2009).  However, while this level and 
breadth, of access would have been impossible to obtain using conventional primary 
data collection methods, these data have, invariably, been subject to some form of 
selection or summarising prior to publication (Saunders et al., 2012). 
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Our curiosity about the potential issues of OL in the Mid Staffordshire case was 
prompted by widespread media reports, especially by the rhetoric of the need to learn 
from mistakes, coupled with concern about the seriousness and apparently 
commonplace nature of such crises, along with prior interest in Bateson’s double bind 
concept (Langley et al., 2014). 
 
We commenced a search for secondary data about the Mid Staffordshire case in 2013. 
This search was both retrospective and contemporaneous. As described in the 
following section, the Mid Staffordshire crisis unfolded over several years. For the 
purpose of bounding the data search, we decided to regard the first indication of poor 
performance at Stafford Hospital in a formal report, in 2002, by the Commission for 
Health Improvement (CHI) as the beginning of this longitudinal case study and our 
search for documentary evidence. The search continues up to and including the time of 
writing this paper; we anticipate that new documentary sources will continue to appear. 
The search yielded a wide range of publically available inquiry reports and other 
secondary accounts. Following Bowen (2009) sources were evaluated in terms of 
relevance, completeness and balance, alongside the each document’s original purpose 
and intended audience.  These sources include numerous documents found on the 
website of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust public inquiryi, including the 
Francis report (Francis, 2013a) of the inquiry presented to parliament (comprising 1776 
pages in three volumes and including verbatim transcripts of evidence), alongside 
numerous unsolicited news media reports in both national and trade press (for 
example, Lintern 2013).  
 
These documentary sources were treated like field notes (Turner, 1983), analysis 
being based on categorising themes and patterns of language found in relation to the 
components of the double bind. The data were read and reviewed in order to yield two 
initial types of finding. First, we constructed a contextual timeline of events outlining the 
crisis as it unfolded, including the principal actors involved and actions taken. The 
timeline is presented below in the form of a narrative with an accompanying summary 
table (Table 1). Second, we applied the five components of Bateson’s double bind 
concept as an interpretive framework. Through this we produced an account of the 
possible structure of a double bind as it relates to this case.  
  
 
The case of Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
Within the UK NHS there have been an increasing number of public inquiries 
addressing failings in health care, relating in particular to unprofessional and 
unacceptable behaviour, poor treatment and unsafe practices. A consideration 
(Walshe and Higgins, 2002) of 59 NHS inquiries over the period 1974 – 2002 highlights 
four reoccurring themes. These they summarise as (1) isolation hindering peer review 
and constructive critical exchange, (2) inadequate leadership which lacks vision and is 
unwilling to tackle problems, (3) system and process failure and poor communication,  
and (4) disempowered staff and patients. The last of these, they argued, meant that 
problems were not picked up (Walshe and Higgins, 2002). Based on their analysis 
Walshe and Higgins noted many of the failings were organisational and cultural and 
would necessitate changes in attitudes, values, beliefs and behaviours which were 
difficult to prescribe in recommendations. 
 
Eleven years after Walshe and Higgins’ (2002) analysis was published, similar issues 
were uncovered by the public inquiry into the apparently high mortality (Healthcare 
Commission, 2009: 3) at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust’s Stafford 
Hospital (Francis, 2013a). However, the publication of the Francis Report in 2013 was 
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by no means the first indication of poor performance at Stafford Hospital (see Table 1). 
In 2002 the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) published a report outlining a 
lack of governance, poor culture and some staff under pressure, raising doubt about 
both hospital management and shortfalls in nurse staffing that were perceived to 
influence the ability to provide quality care. The report emphasised that urgent action 
was needed (CHI, 2002; cited in Francis, 2013). 
 
The following year (2003) concerns were raised in a peer review report regarding the 
quality of care, a lack of staff and a lack of feedback from managers (Lintern, 2013).  In 
2004 the Hospital had received a zero star rating from the Healthcare Commission 
(2004), the regulatory body that succeeded CHI. This star rating indicated that the 
hospital had shown the poorest level of performance, by failing to achieve four of nine 
key targets. In particular the hospital underachieved on cancer treatment and financial 
management and significantly underachieved in relation to waiting times for both 
outpatients and elective admissions. 
   
In 2005 a new Chief Executive, Martin Yeates, was appointed and the Hospital looked 
to apply for Foundation Trust (FT) status, whilst also announcing the loss of 150 posts 
(Lintern, 2013). At that time, FT status, which gave NHS Trusts a greater degree of 
autonomy from central government, was predicated primarily upon finance and not 
quality of patient care (Lintern, 2013). The loss of these posts, Yeates argued, would 
save £10 million (Lintern, 2013:2) and was necessary for the Hospital to be financially 
sustainable, and hence no longer underperforming against one of its key performance 
targets. The Hospital also instigated a ban on the use of agency staff, which were more 
expensive, and left 150 posts vacant, a third of which were clinical positions. 
 
A 2006 peer review report emphasised the same concerns as in 2002, a subsequent 
2007 external assessment (Dr Foster Intelligence, cited in Lintern, 2013) then 
highlighting that hospital mortality was 27 per cent above what would be expected. The 
Dr Foster guide (Dr Foster Intelligence, 2007) described the hospital as being 
`vulnerable’, with `insufficient senior medical cover in A&E’ (Accident and Emergency). 
The hospital maintained that the relatively high mortality rate was due to an 
administrative problem rather than the quality of clinical care. However, the report of 
the Healthcare Commission (2009:3) commented that `The response of the trust to our 
requests for information contained insufficient detail to support its claim that the alerts 
were due to problems with its recording of data, and not problems with the quality of 
care for patients’.  
 
Over the next two years there were increasing local newspaper reports regarding poor 
care at the Hospital, and an action group ‘Cure the NHS’, established by people who 
had lost relatives or experienced poor care standards, was formed after a public 
meeting (Lintern, 2013). In 2008, at the same time as these concerns were being 
raised, the hospital was awarded FT status. Within a few months of being awarded FT 
status, the Healthcare Commission had launched an investigation into the high death 
rates at the Hospital. Writing some four years later, the Francis Inquiry (2013a:7) 
highlighted the role of patients and carers in bringing about this awareness;  
 
In the end, the truth was uncovered in part by attention being paid to 
the true implications of its mortality rates, but mainly because of the 
persistent complaints made by a very determined group of patients 
and those close to them. This group wanted to know why they and 
their loved ones had been failed so badly.  
 
Reporting in 2009, the Healthcare Commission revealed that between 400 and 1,200 
more people died than would have been expected between April 2005 and March 
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2008, highlighting `appalling care’ and neglect of patients. It was noted in the Hospital 
Trust’s subsequent review that: `A central theme of the failures at Mid Staffordshire 
hospital trust appears to be an over reliance on process measures, targets and striving 
for Foundation Trust status at the expense of an overarching focus on providing quality 
services for patients’ (Colin-Thomé, 2009:5) 
 
In July 2009 the first independent inquiry was ordered, chaired by Robert Francis QC, 
the report being published in 2010 (Francis, 2010a,b). This report concluded that 
patients were routinely neglected, and that the culture was a bullying, focused on 
government targets and ignoring the needs of patients.  
 
In June 2010 a second inquiry, again chaired by Francis, was announced to look at the 
role of the commissioning, supervisory and regulatory bodies in the monitoring of the 
Trust. The (Francis) Report, published in 2013, contained 290 recommendations and 
stated that fundamental change was required. Francis (2013a:4) referred to `an 
institutional culture which ascribed more weight to positive information about the 
service than to information capable of implying cause for concern’, arguing that such 
behaviour may have been fostered by governments’ performance culture, combining 
targets and blame, engendering a culture of fear of failure and reward for achievement 
of financial and measureable operational targets.  
 
Within this culture, Francis (2013a:10) commented, `staff did not feel able to report 
concerns’; `the trust board shut itself off from what was happening and ignored its 
patients’;  and a `culture of bullying prevented people from doing their jobs properly’. 
Within this, employees were continually exhorted to meet performance targets or be 
punished. 
As summarised by the Inquiry Report (Francis, 2013a:5): 
The demands for financial control, corporate governance, commissioning 
and regulatory systems are understandable and in many cases necessary. 
But it is not the system itself which will ensure that the patient is put first day 
in and day out. Any system should be capable of caring and delivering an 
acceptable level of care to each patient treated, but this report shows that 
this cannot be assumed to be happening.  
 
The extent of the failure of the system shown in this report suggests that a 
fundamental culture change is needed. This does not require a root and 
branch reorganisation – the system has had many of those – but it requires 
changes which can largely be implemented within the system that has now 
been created by the new reforms. I hope that the recommendations in this 
report can contribute to that end and put patients where they are entitled to 
be – the first and foremost consideration of the system and everyone who 
works in it. 
 
In summary, the 2013 Francis Inquiry emphasised that the current organisational 
culture of a fear of failure and a focus on financial measurable targets had to change. 
Whilst the report considered this could be implemented within the new system that had 
been created by new NHS reforms to deliver an acceptable level of care to each 
patient, Francis emphasised repeatedly the need to learn from the past.  
 
On 27th February 2014, the Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt confirmed that the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust would be dissolved, its two hospitals being taken over 
by the neighbouring NHS trusts (Cooper, 2014).   
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The case of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust through the lens of the 
double bind 
We now examine these events through the lens of the five components of Bateson’s 
double bind. 
 
For a double bind to exist, it must be possible to identify the persons or parties involved 
and a significant, enduring relationship between them. It is important to note that a 
double bind can exist between parties at various levels. In the NHS it would be 
possible, for example, to consider the relationship between government and the NHS; 
between the Mid Staffordshire Hospital Foundation Trust and Stafford Hospital; 
between the hospital’s management and its clinicians (doctors, nurses and other health 
care professionals); and between the clinicians and the hospital’s patients and their 
carers. In this case all these relationships are relevant, however for the purposes of 
this paper we concentrate on the relationship between Stafford Hospital’s management 
and its clinicians. These groups engage in repeated, recurrent interaction in order 
provide healthcare, including maternity, critical, outpatients and paediatric services 
alongside and accident and emergency services, for the surrounding geographical 
area (Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust, 2014).  
 
It is important, nevertheless, to stress that this relationship cannot be taken as existing 
in isolation. As noted above, Francis (2013a:4) highlighted the importance of a context 
in which the government’s performance culture, combining targets and blame, 
engendering a culture of fear of failure and reward for achievement of financial and 
measureable operational targets. Stafford Hospital operated and continues to operate 
within the overall context of the UK publically funded NHS. This is a context 
characterised by debate about the relationship between budgets and changes in 
demand for healthcare. It is also a context in which a large number of inquiries into 
failings have highlighted common issues relating to hindering of peer review and lack 
of constructive critical exchange, inadequate leadership, system and process failure, 
and disempowered staff and patients (Walshe and Higgins, 2002).  
 
The conditions for the third and fourth components of the double bind, the primary and 
secondary injunctions, arise for example through the need for the hospital to address 
the 2004 underachievement in financial performance, resulting in its zero star rating, 
alongside a requirement to be financially sound in order to achieve FT status, which 
led to a reduction in the number of employees. Then, in 2009, the hospital needing to 
address the high mortality rates, which were 27% above what would be expected.  
 
The primary and secondary injunctions are created by exhorting the medical and  
nursing staff both to meet performance targets for productivity and efficiency, and to 
comply fully with policies and procedures relating to quality standards, accompanied by 
the threat of sanctions for failure or non-compliance.  
 
Why would managers not acknowledge and perhaps remedy such a situation? An 
insight into this is offered by the co-founder of Dr Foster, the healthcare information 
organisation (Taylor, 2013):  
What happens when a hospital like Mid-Staffordshire finds it is struggling to 
deliver a high quality service with the resources available?  
As an NHS chief executive in that situation, you could simply overspend and 
breach your targets – and quite likely lose your job.  
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You could try to argue to re-organise services but you are likely to face 
considerable opposition from both clinicians and the public.  
Or you can just cut costs, cross your fingers and hope that no-one notices if the 
standards of care deteriorate.  
The frightening truth about the NHS is that the third of those options is the one 
that every incentive in the system is pushing you towards.  
Because the risk that a poor quality service will get identified quickly, and the risk 
of that having consequences for your career, remain troublingly remote.  
Under pressure to cope with these conflicting demands, staff may also find themselves 
faced with what appears to be an impossible dilemma. Either they must seek ways to 
cope with apparently unattainable targets - which is likely to impact on standards - or 
they must prioritise standards - which is likely to impair the meeting of targets. Either 
choice is likely to entail compromises or violations (Amalberti et al., 2006), and 
therefore holds the prospect of sanctions. Hence the position in which staff find 
themselves is of the form, `damned if you do, damned if you don’t’. 
 
For example, Lintern (2013:3) quotes Dr Chris Turner, an emergency medicine trainee 
at Stafford A&E, as complaining of: 
 
a bullying culture and harassment of staff to meet targets, which put patients 
at risk. With not enough staff, Dr Turner said the department had “no vision of 
what ‘good’ looked like”. He said: “There were not enough nurses; those who 
remained were demoralised. They had no senior nurse to unite and lead them. 
They were threatened on a near daily basis that they would lose their jobs if 
they did not get patients through the department within the four hour target.  
 
The experience of patients in these circumstances can be gleaned from the evidence 
gathered from patients and their families or careers in Francis’s first inquiry (2010b). 
This covers the years 2005-9 and includes both positive and negative experiences. An 
example of the latter type is (Francis, 2010b:15): 
 
The patient went to A&E at Stafford Hospital suffering from abdominal 
discomfort. A junior doctor insisted it was a urine infection but the patient was 
certain it was appendicitis. When the patient asked to see a specialist he was 
ignored and discharged. The following day the patient collapsed when his 
appendix burst.  
 
The patient was admitted to hospital as a result of the burst appendix and had a 
successful operation. However, on Ward 6 he was rarely offered water and his 
catheter was frequently left to overflow. On one occasion he noticed that oxygen 
tubes were passed between patients without being cleaned and observed that no 
one used the available anti-bacterial gels. 
 
The double bind involves the further dilemma of whether, and at what point, an 
individual member of staff speaks out about the situation. If they do speak out, they 
take a risk because there is evidence that they may be punished for doing so by 
managers and colleagues, who may perceive the whistle-blowing as disloyalty. Yet if 
they keep quiet they risk breaching (for example) their code of professional ethics. If 
found in future to have chosen not to speak out despite knowing that such problems 
exist, they could be blamed for not speaking out and punished. In short, actors face the 
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prospect of being punished if they do speak out, and punished if they do not. In effect 
this adds a further, `damned if they do and damned if they don’t’. Members of staff 
could, therefore, have concerns about the reasons for the higher than expected 
mortality rates, yet end up being punished whether or not they speak out about those 
concerns.   
 
The tertiary injunction preventing escape from the prototypical bind therefore relates to 
the culture within the Hospital. The Francis Report (2013a) highlighted the institutional 
culture which focussed upon positive information and a performance culture combining 
targets and blame. This compounds and falsifies the context of the prototypical bind; in 
other words, the very existence of the dilemma faced by staff (i.e. about the perceived 
choice between targets and standards) is denied by management. It is this denial of 
the experience and perceived reality of the dilemma that, in Bateson’s original 
formulation of the double bind, gave rise to pathology. In other words, a person in this 
situation is forced to find a way to cope with being in an impossible dilemma and 
having the existence of that dilemma denied. From this perspective, one can argue that 
behaviours such as compromising on patient care and falsifying performance data 
represent what are perceived as the only possible ways to cope.  
 
An additional irony – or tragedy – occurs if external solutions compound this bind. Thus 
it may be tempting (especially for politicians and the media) to construct such 
situations retrospectively as ones in which actors had clear knowledge of 
unsatisfactory practice and a simple rational choice to make about whether or not to 
speak out. Logically, therefore, imposing sanctions for the failure to speak out should 
ensure that unsatisfactory practice is exposed. However, it is more likely that actors 
experience the double bind as shifting `shades of grey’, seldom coalescing into a 
situation in which it is either definitely time to speak out, or definitely devoid of 
concerns about standards. Far from forcing a solution to the double bind, the 
introduction of additional sanctions is likely to exacerbate the double bind and 
encourage a search for possible coping behaviours.  
 
Interventions designed as a response to the initial bind, especially if based on a linear, 
rational problem-solving approach, are therefore almost certainly inadequate for the 
purpose of resolving the paradoxical, recursive patterns of communication that are 
involved in a double bind. In consequence, such solutions can have the opposite effect 
to that intended; they are more likely to prevent OL than to enable it. Or, to nuance this 
slightly, the OL that is most likely to occur is in the form of innovations in coping 
behaviour.     
 
While there is not space here to discuss what can be done to address double binds, 
our previous research on arts organisations facing failure (Langley et al., 2014) 
highlights interest in the different ways in which organisations respond to and manage 
double binds. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In order to explore how the double bind concept offers a potential explanation of the 
dilemmas faced by people in organisations such as Stafford Hospital, we have applied 
this concept, to secondary data concerning the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust. We acknowledge limitations of this approach, especially its interpretive nature. 
Invariably the analysis presented above needs to be refined and validated through 
further work.  
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However, our findings could have important implications for practice because similar 
dynamics, and similar failures to learn, have been noted elsewhere in the NHS. For 
example, prior to the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust inquiry, the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary’s Kennedy Inquiry (2001), which also highlighted features that could be said 
to resemble the components of the double bind. The Bristol Royal Infirmary report 
highlighted the hierarchical relationship between doctors and other caring staff as a 
significant cultural weakness, nurses who raised concerns often being ignored 
(Kennedy, 2001). Analysis indicated that the behaviours of doctors and other caring 
staff were dictated by and justified within these cultural norms, in effect a ‘culture of 
entrapment’ (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2003:6). Non-compliance with the hierarchical 
culture, in which doctors instructions were to be carried out, was linked with some kind 
of cost to the individual (Lawrence et al., 2009; Scott, 2008).  
 
This study has potential significance socially and economically, given that the situation 
faced by the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust is important to many other types 
of organisations, occurring frequently in both public and private sectors.  
 
As noted above, on 27th February 2014, the Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt confirmed 
that the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust would be dissolved, The demise of an 
organisation can be one way for it to escape a double bind – although this does not 
guarantee that the double bind will not be replicated within the new organisational 
arrangements. Our continuing research is concerned with whether and how organisations 
can manage and respond to double binds in ways that avoid the tragic consequences seen 
in Mid-Staffordshire.  
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Date Event Source 
2002 The Commission for Health 
Improvement report 
Commission for Health Improvement 
clinical governance report (cited in 
Francis, 2013) 
2003 Peer review report `raised serious 
concerns about the accident and 
emergency department at Stafford 
Hospital’ 
Lintern (2013:2)   
2004 The Hospital received a zero star rating 
from the Commission for Health 
Improvement 
Francis (2013a: 41) 
2005 (September) New Chief Executive, 
Martin Yeates, appointed  
Lintern (2013)   
2006 Hospital looks to apply for ‘foundation 
status’. 
Peer review report emphasises the 
same concerns as an earlier review in 
2002 
Lintern (2013)   
2007 (April) External assessment highlighted 
that Hospital mortality was 27% above 
what would be expected. The trust 
maintained the problem was to do with 
how patient deaths were coded, 
although this was shown not to be the 
case. 
Dr Foster Hospital Guide (2007), cited in 
Lintern (2013:3) 
2007 An action group, ‘Cure the NHS’ was 
formed after a public meeting 
Lintern (2013:3)   
2008 (February) The Hospital was awarded 
foundation status 
Lintern (2013:4)   
2009 Healthcare Commission report 
`includes a figure for the expected 
number of deaths due to poor care of 
400 to 1,200 between 2005 and 2008’. 
Trust Chief executive Martin Yeates 
resigns in May. 
Lintern (2013:4)   
 
 
 
Colin-Thomé (2009) 
2009 (July) The first independent inquiry was 
ordered, chaired by Robert Francis QC 
Lintern (2013:4)   
2010 (February) First Francis report 
published 
 
2010 (June) A second inquiry is announced, 
again chaired by Robert Francis 
http://www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com/  
2013 (February) The final report of the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
Public Inquiry is Report published 
http://www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com/re
port  
2014 (February) Health Secretary Jeremy 
Hunt backs calls to dissolve the trust that 
runs the scandal-hit Stafford Hospital. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-
stoke-staffordshire-26349205 
 
Table 1: The Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust crisis: a timeline 
(developed from Colin-Thomé, 2009:27-8; Lintern, 2013) 
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